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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G), the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction in this matter. The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson granted The 
Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability, holding 
Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Hartford") liable to The Estate of 
Dorothy Berkemeir, by and through its Executor, Karen Nielsen (the "Estate"), for the 
damages of Dorothy Berkemeir ("Ms. Berkemeir") under the provisions of an 
underinsured motorist insurance policy. 
In holding that Hartford is contractually liable to the Estate, the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson determined that, after the cause action accrued, Utah's Personal 
Injury Survival Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, is inapplicable to the first-party 
contractual relationship between Hartford and its insured, Ms. Berkemeir, and 
subsequent to her death, the Estate, for a number of reasons. 
Hartford appeals from the District Court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-196). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Was the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson correct in ruling that, after the cause 
of action against Hartford accrued, the Personal Injury Survival Statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-12, does not apply to the Underinsured Motorist Coverage contained 
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in the first-party insurance contract issued by Hartford to its insured, Mrs. Berkemeir, 
where neither Mrs. Berkemeir nor her Estate have fully recovered for the damages 
Mrs. Berkemeir sustained in an automobile accident? 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On May 22, 2001, Hartford filed a Notice 
Regarding Filing of Petition to Appeal from Interlocutory Order (R. 207-08), 
appealing from the District Court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-196) 
Standard of Review: 
The application of the Personal Injury Survival Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-12, to the accrued cause of action under the insurance contract presents a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Bearden v. Croft, 31 P.3d 
537, 538, If 5 (Utah 2001); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,636-37 
(Utah 1989). The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 also presents a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
In addition, a trial court's summary judgment ruling is reviewed for 
correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 31 P.3d 537, 538, ^ 5 (Utah 2001); Surety 
Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 340, fl 14 (Utah 2000); see also 
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1277 (Utah 1998); 
Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 905-06 (Utah 1998). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 78-11-12 of the Utah Code provides: 
Survival of action for injury to person or death upon 
death of wrongdoer or injured person-Exception and 
restriction to out-of pocket expenses. 
(1 )(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence 
of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer 
or the injured person. The injured person or the personal 
representative or heirs of the person who died have a 
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general 
damages, subject to subsection (1)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person 
dies as a result of a cause of action other than the injury 
received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of 
the wrongdoer, the personal representative or heirs of that 
person are entitled to receive no more than the out-of-
pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of the injured 
person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996)(emphasis added).1 
1
 Because the motor vehicle accident occurred in Wyoming (R. 19), 
Wyoming's survival statute would apply to any tort claim against Mr. Alexander. 
Wyoming Code Ann. § 1-4-101. Although this is a unique survival statute, its 
interpretation indicates essentially the same result as would be achieved as by the 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996) to this case. E.g., Parsons v. 
Roussalis, 488 P.2d 1050,1052 (Wyo. 1971). 
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Section 31A-21-313 of the Utah Code provides: 
Limitation of actions. 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party 
insurance must be commenced within three years after the 
inception of the loss. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1996)(emphasis added)(Addendum #1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment dated 
March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-196) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On November 2, 1999, the Estate filed its Complaint against Hartford. The 
Complaint sought damages for Hartford's breach of the Underinsured Motorist 
coverage provisions in the insurance policy Hartford issued to Ms. Berkemeir. The 
case was assigned to the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, who on January 29,2001, 
entertained oral argument on Defendant Hartford Insurance Company of the 
Midwest's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (R. 120-122) 
At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Hanson granted the Estate's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment and denied Hartford's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 155) At the conclusion of his ruling, Judge Hanson instructed 
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counsel for the Estate, Mark A. Larsen ("Mr. Larsen"), to prepare the Order. Mr. 
Larsen prepared the Order in accordance with the instruction of Judge Hanson and 
submitted it to counsel for Hartford, Mark L. Anderson, for review. (R. 155) On 
March 5, 2001, Hartford objected to the proposed Order, asserting the Order 
impermissibly expanded the scope of Judge Hanson's ruling. (R. 129-148) On 
March 23,2001, the Estate filed its Response to Hartford's Objection, asserting that 
the proposed Order was consistent with Judge Hanson's oral ruling and instruction 
regarding Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 153-58) On May 7, 
2001, Judge Hanson ruled that the proposed Order "properly set forth the basis for 
granting summary judgment," and accordingly, overruled Hartford's objections. 
(Minute Entry dated May 7, 2001, R. 203; Addendum #2) 
On May 22, 2001, Hartford filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Utah to 
appeal from Judge Hanson's interlocutory Order. (R. 207) On July 23, 2001, this 
appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals 
for disposition. (R. 213-14). 
C. Disposition of Trial Court 
Judge Hanson entered his ruling in an Order Granting the Estate's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-196) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the facts upon which Hartford and the Estate based 
their respective Motions for Summary Judgment. The facts to which the parties 
stipulated are contained in the Stipulation as to Facts and Legal Positions ("the 
Stipulation")(Addendum #3), which was filed with the District Court on August 11, 
2000. (R. 18-27) In addition to the facts set forth in the Stipulation, there was one 
additional fact the Estate presented to the District Court: Hartford did not object to 
Berkemeir's settlement of all claims against Mr. Alexander for the $50,000 limit of his 
policy with Allstate.2 
Given this setting, it should have been easy for Hartford to recite for this Court 
all of the relevant facts presented to Judge Hanson. Despite the ease with which 
this task could be accomplished, Hartford chose instead to attempt to distort the 
factual record. Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the Estate will not recite the facts contained in Appellant's brief, but wishes to direct 
the Court's attention to the following: 
2
 Letter from Kristine Edde, former counsel for Plaintiff, to Jeffrey Powell of 
Hartford dated October 8,1996. Attached as Exhibit 1 to the Estate's Memorandum 
in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 104A) Letter from Kristine Edde, 
former counsel for Plaintiff, to Mark Anderson, counsel for Hartford dated October 
28, 1996. Attached as Exhibit 2 to the Estate's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Hartford's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 104B) Hartford did not dispute this fact, which became 
admitted pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration 4-501 (2)(B). 
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A. Hartford's Statement of Facts Contains Facts Which Are Not 
Based upon the Record. 
In its Statement of Facts, on page 7 of its brief, Hartford states: "Hartford did 
not agree that Berkemeir's damages exceeded $100,000. However, it agreed that 
such damages exceeded $50,000, and made a settlement offer. The matter was not 
settled, and the parties agreed to resolve the dispute over UIM benefits through 
binding arbitration." Contrary to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7)&(e), Hartford does not 
support these statements with a citation to the record because these facts are not 
contained in the record. This information was not before Judge Hanson when he 
ruled on Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
Moreover, facts concerning settlement negotiations are inadmissible and could 
not be considered in deciding a Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Rule 
408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, such facts are inadmissible. Rule 408 provides 
in relevant part: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to 
furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, 
a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either 
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or 
invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
If not admissible, these facts cannot be considered on a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in any event. U.R.C.P. 56(e). Because facts concerning settlement 
negotiations were not properly before Judge Hanson, this Court should disregard 
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this portion of Hartford's Statement of Facts, which are an inaccurate, incomplete, 
unsupported report of inadmissible negotiations, distorted in such a manner as to 
suggest that Hartford, at some time, was reasonable. 
B. Hartford's Statement of Facts Does Not Contain Relevant 
Facts Which Are Set Forth in the Stipulation and Supported 
by the Record. 
There are facts relevant to the determination of this appeal which surprisingly 
are not contained in Hartford's Statement of Facts. These facts were before Judge 
Hanson when he denied Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the 
Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. In 
compliance with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Estate sets 
forth the following additional facts: 
1. Paragraph 15 of the Stipulation, which is not set forth in Hartford's 
Statement of Facts, provides: 
Ms. Berkemeir's auto policy from Hartford (the "Policy") 
extended coverage for medical payments and personal 
injury protection (Policy, Part B). Hartford paid the medical 
limit of $5,000 under this coverage provision of the Policy. 
Hartford also paid the personal injury protection limit of 
$5,000 under this coverage provision. Payments made by 
Hartford under Part B of the Policy totaled $10,000. All 
Part B payments were directed to reimbursement of 
medical expenses incurred by Mrs. Berkemeir as a result 
of the automobile accident of October 16, 1995. 
(R. 21) 
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2. In addition to provisions set forth on pages 6 and 7 of Hartford's 
Statement of Facts, Paragraph 16 of the Stipulation refers to a provision in the Policy 
which provides: "We will not make a duplicate payment under this coverage for any 
element of loss for which payment has been made by or on behalf of persons or 
organizations who may be legally responsible. (Policy, Section III, Limit of Liability, 
paragraph C, at p. 16)" (R. 22) 
3. Paragraph 17 of the Stipulation provides as follows: 
Ms. Berkemeir made demand upon Hartford for payment 
of the $100,000 under her UIM coverage, resulting in an 
arbitration proceeding originally scheduled to begin on 
July 21, 1997. The hearing was subsequently 
rescheduled for September 23, 1997 because of an 
independent medical examination of Ms. Berkemeir that 
had to be rescheduled. 
(R. 22) 
4. Paragraph 19 of the Stipulation states: "After Ms. Berkemeir's death 
and prior to the rescheduled arbitration proceeding, the Berkemeir Estate demanded 
payment from Hartford of $45,580.40 under the UIM coverage as a contractual claim 
against the Policy." (R. 22) 
5. In addition, Paragraph 20 of the Stipulation provides: 
Hartford denied the Berkemeir Estate's contractual claim 
against the Policy in light of its interpretation of applicable 
Utah Law, and Ms. Berkemeir's death. In part, Hartford's 
denial of the claim was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-
12(1), which states: 
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(a) Causes of action arising out of 
personal injury to the person or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of another 
do not abate upon the death of the 
wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured 
person or the personal representative or 
heirs of the person who died have a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special 
and general damages, subject to subsection 
(D(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement 
the injured person dies as a result of a cause 
of action other than the injury received as a 
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the 
wrongdoer, the personal representative or 
heirs of that person are entitled to receive no 
more than the out-of-pocket expenses 
incurred by or on behalf of the injured person 
as the result of his injury. 
(R. 23) 
6. Finally, Paragraph 21 of the Stipulation states: "After Ms. Berkemeir's 
demise Hartford withdrew its demand to arbitrate, believing there was no benefit 
owing to the Berkemeir Estate because of Ms. Berkemeir's death from causes 
unrelated to the accident. The Berkemeir Estate then filed this action." (R. 23) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There is an extraordinarily strange anomaly in this case: If the arbitration 
occurred as originally scheduled, Hartford unquestionably would have paid most, if 
not all, of its $100,000 policy limits to Ms. Berkemeir. Only the delay or 
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postponement of the arbitration scheduled prior to Ms. Berkemeir's untimely death 
creates even an arguable position for Hartford in this case. The issue presented in 
this case is when the damages under the underinsured motorist coverage contained 
in the policy should be measured: On the date of the settlement with the underlying 
tortfeasor, on the date Hartford refused to pay Ms. Berkemeir the underinsured 
motorist coverage based upon her demand, or on the date of the arbitration award. 
On October 16, 1995, Ms. Berkemeir sustained personal injuries in an 
automobile accident. On October 9,1996, Ms. Berkemeir settled her personal injury 
claim against James Alexander ("Mr. Alexander"), the driver of the other vehicle 
involved in the collision, for the $50,000 limit of his liability insurance policy with 
Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). However, the proceeds of the settlement 
agreement, coupled with the $10,000 in personal injury and medical benefits 
Hartford paid to Ms. Berkemeir under her insurance policy, did not fully compensate 
the damages she sustained as a result of the collision. 
As a result, Ms. Berkemeir demanded that Hartford pay the $100,000 in 
underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration proceeding under the policy originally 
was scheduled for July 21, 1997. It was continued until September 23, 1997, to 
allow Hartford an opportunity to conduct an Independent Medical Examination of Ms. 
Berkemeir. Ms. Berkemeir died in the interim on August 15, 1997, of causes 
unrelated to the injuries she sustained in the October 16, 1995, collision. Prior to 
Ms. Berkemeir's death, Hartford paid the medical limit and the personal injury 
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protection limit of the Policy. After Ms. Berkemeir's death, Hartford refused the 
claim, asserting Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) precludes the Estate from 
collecting under the insurance contract. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, however, does not apply to the facts of this case 
because the Estate's claim is based in contract law rather than personal injury tort 
law. Moreover, Ms. Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford accrued, and the 
statute of limitations on her claim against Hartford began running, on the date of her 
settlement with Alexander, on the date Hartford refused to pay Ms. Berkemeir the 
underinsured motorist coverage based upon her demand, or upon Hartford's refusal 
to pay underinsured motorist benefits to Berkemeir in breach of the insurance 
contract. The damages would be measured as of the date of the breach of the 
contract, when the cause of action accrued, and would not change based upon 
subsequent events. When the cause of action accrues drives the interpretation of 
the "legally entitled to recover" phrase in the insurance contract's underinsured 
motorist provision. 
Even if this Court were to apply Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 in the 
interpretation of the "legally entitled to recover" phrase in the insurance contract's 
Underinsured Motorist Provision, this would not eliminate the Estate's ability to 
recover against Hartford. Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 explicitly states: "Causes of 
action arising out of personal injury to the person... caused by the wrongful act 
or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the 
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injured person...." Consequently, Ms. Berkemeir's death would not dictate that 
she was not "legally entitled to recover" against the underlying tortfeasor. That is 
why Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 is referred to as a "Survival Statute." 
Hartford sponsors two illogical positions, the adoption of both of which are 
necessary to reach the conclusion that the Estate has no claim against Hartford: 
1. The Estate's damages are measured at the time the arbitration award 
is entered, not at the time the cause of action against Hartford accrues, 
causing Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) to apply to the interpretation 
of the "legally entitled" phrase in the underinsured motorist provision of 
the insurance policy. 
2. Even though Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) applies, the under-
insured motorist provision of the insurance policy entitles Hartford to 
dictate that any recovery obtained by an insured must first be applied 





UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 DOES NOT DIRECTLY 
APPLY TO THE ESTATE'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF 
THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
This is a contract, not a tort, claim. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 applies to 
causes of action based upon personal injury claims and alters the available 
damages where the victim of a tort dies from unrelated causes prior to the entry of 
a judgment. It, however, does not directly alter the available damages where the 
claim is contractual in nature, as opposed to a personal injury tort claim. The 
litigation in this case against Hartford is based upon the Estate's succession to Ms. 
Berkemeir's breach of contract claim against Hartford. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, 
therefore, does not directly apply to this case. 
Hartford now belatedly concedes that the claim in this case is a contract claim 
based on the first-party insurance contract between Ms. Berkemeir and Hartford 
under which Hartford agreed to provide insurance to Ms. Berkemeir, including 
underinsured motorist coverage. See Bergera v. Ideal Nat'lLife Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 
599,600 (Utah 1985)(an insurance policy is "merely a contract between the insured 
and the insurer"). Prior to Ms. Berkemeir's death, Hartford refused to pay Ms. 
Berkemeir her underinsured motorist benefits. Later, Hartford denied the Estate's 
claim under the underinsured motorist provisions of the contract, asserting that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) precludes the Estate from collecting on the insurance 
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contract. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, however, does not directly apply to the facts 
of this case because Ms. Berkemeir's claim against Hartford sounds in contract, not 
in tort. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12(1) specifically applies to "[cjauses of action arising 
out of personal injury to the person or death caused by the wrongful act or 
negligence of another. . . ." (Emphasis added). Ms. Berkemeir's personal injury 
claim against Mr. Alexander was settled for the limits of his insurance policy with 
Allstate. What remains is the Estate's claim against Hartford based on the insurance 
contract between Ms. Berkemeir and Hartford. 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
held: "[l]n a first-party3 relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties 
and obligations of the parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. Without more, 
a breach of those implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of action 
in contract, not tort." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 
1985)(emphasis added). In Beck, the insured raised a bad faith claim against the 
insurer based upon the insurer's failure to investigate the claim and settle it, in 
breach of the insurer's duty to deal with the insured fairly and in good faith. In 
holding the breach gave rise to a cause of action in contract, the Court expressly 
rejected such a cause of action based in tort, stating: 
3
 The Court used the term "first-party" to refer to an insurance contract under 
which the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses the 
insured has sustained. 
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We recognize that a majority of states permit an insured 
to institute a tort action against an insurer who fails to 
bargain in good faith in a "first-party" situation . . . . 
Apparently these courts have taken this step as a matter 
of policy in order to provide what they perceive to be an 
adequate remedy for an insured wronged by an insurer's 
recalcitrance. These courts have reasoned that under 
contract law principles, an insurer who improperly 
refuses to settle a first-party claim may be liable only 
for damages measured by the maximum dollar amount 
of the insurance provided by the policy, and such a 
damage measure provides little or no incentive to an 
insurer to promptly and faithfully fulfill its contractual 
obligations. Accordingly, these courts have adopted a tort 
approach in order to allow an insured to recover extensive 
consequential and punitive damages, which they consider 
to be unavailable in an action based solely on a breach of 
contract. We conclude that the tort approach adopted 
by these courts is without a sound theoretical 
foundation and has the potential for distorting well-
established principles of contract law. 
Beckv. Farmers Ins. Exc/7.,701 P.2d at 798-99 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Unlike the courts that have adopted the tort approach as a means of providing 
an insured with an adequate remedy for an insurer's recalcitrance, Hartford seeks 
to eliminate any further liability to the Estate by applying the tort provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to the insurance contract. Hartford seeks this result despite 
stipulating that Berkemeir was not fully compensated for the damages she incurred 
as a result of the accident. To directly apply Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to the 
Estate's breach of contract claim is not only contrary to the policy concerns set forth 
above, but a distortion of contract law. 
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POINT II 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 APPLIES, IF AT ALL, 
ONLY WD/REC7L YIN INTERPRETING THE "LEGALLY 
ENTITLED" PHRASE IN THE CONTRACT. 
Once Hartford acknowledged, as it did in the appeal of this case for the first 
time, that the Estate's claim is contractual in nature, the interpretation of the "legally 
entitled" language in the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance contract 
became the only issue in this case. The underinsured motorist provision of the 
insurance policy provides in pertinent part: 
• We will pay compensatory damages which an 
insured is legally entitled to recover from the 
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
uninsured motor vehicle. Any judgment for damages 
arising out of a suit brought without our written consent is 
not binding on us. 
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Berkemeir cannot claim underinsured motorist coverage 
against Hartford until she can establish that Mr. Alexander was driving an 
"underinsured motor vehicle," a defined term in the insurance contract.4 Based upon 
4
 Policy, Part C, Section III, paragraph C at p. 15 defines this term as follows: 
"Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land 
(continued...) 
that definition, she cannot establish that Mr. Alexander was driving an "underinsured 
motor vehicle," until she either (i) obtains a judgment against Mr. Alexander for in 
excess of his policy limits or (ii) settles the claim against him for his full policy limits. 
The definition of "underinsured motor vehicle" requires Mr. Alexander's insurer, 
Allstate, to make a payment of its policy limits to trigger underinsured motorist 
coverage under Hartford's policy. 
In this case, Allstate paid Ms. Berkemeir Mr. Alexander's full policy limits, 
giving Ms. Berkemeir for the very first time the right to assert an underinsured 
motorist claim because, as Hartford stipulated in this case, "[d]ue to the amount of 
Ms. Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the settlement with Allstate would 
not have fully compensated herfor her loss." Stipulation fl 14 (R.21). Ms. Berkemeir 
could not even make a claim under the Hartford policy until Allstate paid its policy 
limits to Ms. Berkemeir. 
4(...continued) 
motor vehicle . . . of any type to which a 
bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at 
the time of the accident.but the amou nt paid 
for bodily injury under that bond or policy 
to an insured is not enough to pay the full 
amount the insured is legally entitled to 
recover as damages. 
Stipulation fl 16 (emphasis added)(R. 22). 
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Whether Ms. Berkemeir is "legally entitled" to recover from Mr. Alexander for 
the personal injuries she sustained in the automobile accident must be measured at 
some point in time. There are three potential candidates: 
1. On the date of Ms. Berkemeir's settlement with Alexander's insurer, 
Allstate; 
2. On the date Hartford refused to pay Ms. Berkemeir the underinsured 
motorist coverage based upon her demand; or 
3. On the date of the arbitration award. 
The Estate contends that either the first or the second dates are appropriate, 
while Hartford in effect, although never articulating it, seems to argue for the third 
date. This seems to be the point in the analysis where the parties diverge. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 Does Not Apply to the Estate's Claim 
Because the Claim Accrued on Hartford's Breach of the Insurance 
Contract. 
Berkemeir's claim for breach of contract accrued on the date of her settlement 
with Mr. Alexander or the date Hartford refused to pay Ms. Berkemeir based upon 
her demand. By at least the latter date, she had a claim against Hartford for 
underinsured motorist benefits. No one ever questioned Alexander's obvious 
liability, to which the parties in this case stipulated. Stipulation ^ 11 (R. 20) The 
damages for that breach of contract are measured on the date of the breach, which 
is when the cause of action accrues, not at some later date after Ms. Berkemeir's 
death. In Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254,1257 (Utah 1983), the 
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Utah Supreme Court held that a claim accrues on the occurrence of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action. 
Prior to her settlement with Mr. Alexander and Hartford's refusal to pay 
underinsured motorist benefits, Ms. Berkemeir did not have a claim against Hartford. 
When Hartford breached the insurance contract, however, the last event necessary 
to create Ms. Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford occurred. 
B. The Statute of Limitations on the Estate's Claim Began Running 
on either the date of the Alexander Settlement or Hartford's 
Refusal to Pay the Underinsured Motorist Benefits in Breach of the 
Insurance Contract. 
The statute of limitations on Berkemeir's claim began running on either the 
date of the Mr. Alexander settlement or Hartford's refusal to pay Berkemeir the 
underinsured motorist benefits, in breach of the insurance contract. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-21 -313 sets forth the statute of limitations for bringing a claim on an insurance 
policy, stating: "An action on a written policy or contract of first part insurance must 
be commenced within three years after the inception of the loss." 
In Lang v. Aetna Life Insurance, 196 F.3d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1999), the 
court discussed the "inception of loss" language of § 31A-21-313, stating: "The 
statute of limitations was triggered not by the personal injury giving rise to the suit 
but rather by the insurer's alleged breach [of contract] in refusing to defend against 
the suit." (emphasis added) 
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Similarly, the inception of Ms. Berkemeir's loss and the breach of contract 
claim was not triggered by the personal injury Ms. Berkemeir suffered but rather by 
Hartford's breach of contract in refusing to pay the underinsured motorist benefits. 
If Hartford's argument in this case were accepted, the statute of limitations would not 
be triggered until Mr. Alexander's liability was reduced to a judgment. 
C. The Interpretation of the Insurance Contract Is Strictly Construed 
Against Hartford, Who Easily Could Have Stated That UIM 
Coverage Becomes Limited or Terminates upon the Death of the 
Insured. 
If Hartford wanted underinsured motorist benefits to become limited or expire 
upon the death of the insured, when the insured dies before an arbitration award is 
entered, it could easily have said so directly in the insurance contract. In U. S. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: "Insurance policies should be strictly construed against the 
insurer and in favor of the insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by 
insurance companies." 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993). The Court also explained 
that "insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance. Id. at 521 -
22 (citations omitted). 
The interpretation of the "legally entitled" language in the underinsured 
motorist provision of the insurance contract is the only issue in this case. Applying 
the rules of interpretation established in Sandt, if there is any argument over whether 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 applies to the Estate's Claim, that ambiguity should be 
resolved in favor of the Estate and against Hartford. 
D. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 is a "Survival Statute": It Explictly 
Prevents Personal Injury Claims from Abating Upon the Injured 
Victim's Death So That Regardless as to When Ms. Berkemeir 
Died, She Always Was "Legally Entitled" to Recover Against Mr. 
Alexander. 
If Ms. Berkemeir died prior her settlement with Mr. Alexander and prior to 
Allstate's payment of the policy limits to her, undoubtedly Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11 -12 would have applied to her cause of action against Mr. Alexander, limiting 
her recovery against him. Even in that event, however, she still would have been 
"legally entitled" to recover against Mr. Alexander. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
explicitly states: "Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person 
or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon 
the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person " Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
only impacts Ms. Berkemeir's remedy against Alexander, but does not impact 
whether she is "legally entitled" to recover against him. 
POINT III 
MS. BERKEMEIR AND HER ESTATE HAVE NOT BEEN 
FULLY COMPENSATED FOR THE DAMAGES SHE 
SUSTAINED IN THE COLLISION. 
Hartford argues Ms. Berkemeir, through the Estate, has been "more than fully 
reimbursed" for the out-of-pocket expenses she incurred as a result of the collision. 
Hartford argues that because Ms. Berkemeir received $60,000 in insurance benefits 
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from Hartford and Allstate, and Ms. Berkemeir's medical expenses totaled 
$38,249.29, plus interest,5 the Estate has been more than fully compensated for the 
totality of the out-of-expenses Ms. Berkemeir incurred as a result of the collision. 
Hartford, however, has not taken into account the attorneys' fees she paid 
from the $50,000 settlement. Nor has Hartford taken into account the most 
significant element of her claim: Her general damages consisting of the pain and 
suffering Berkemeir endured as a result of the injuries she sustained in the collision. 
Moreover, Hartford's argument assumes Ms. Berkemeir's out-of-pocket 
expenses were reimbursed by the settlement and insurance proceeds Ms. Berkemeir 
received. Neither the underinsured motorist provision of the insurance policy nor 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11 -12(1 )(b), however, dictate that any recovery obtained by an 
insured must first be applied to out-of-pocket expenses and subsequently to all other 
damages incurred. Rather, compensation for attorneys' fees, continued medical 
treatment and pain and suffering could be recovered from the settlement, leaving 
out-of-pocket medical expenses uncompensated. The fact that Ms. Berkemeir died 
should not somehow force the Estate to apply the settlement proceeds to out-of-
pocket expenses first, so as to alleviate any further claim for underinsured motorist 
5
 In conjunction with reimbursement for out-of-pocket medical expenses, the 
Estate is entitled to recover interest on the special damages Berkemeir incurred as 
a result of the collision. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 provides that plaintiffs in 
personal injury actions brought to recover damages "may claim interest on the 
special damages actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving 
rise to the cause of action." 
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benefits. Such an interpretation of the insurance contract would eliminate the 
opportunity for whole relief where Hartford has stipulated to the fact that the 
settlement proceeds did not fully compensate Ms. Berkemeir for her losses. 
Furthermore, such an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b), 
reads into the statute meaning beyond its plain words. "The best evidence of the 
true intent and purpose of the legislature is the plain language of the statute." Lieber 
v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (2000). Accordingly, if the 
legislature had intended to limit the provision in such a manner, it would have done 
so explicitly. There is no case law supporting such an interpretation of the "out-of-
pocket" provision of the statute. 
Finally, if Hartford had intended to limit underinsured motorist coverage to out-
of-pocket expenses and require any insurance benefits received by the insured to 
be applied to out-of-pocket expenses first, it should have drafted such a provision 
into the insurance contract. As stated previously, in Sandt the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: "Insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in 
favor of the insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by insurance 
companies." 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993). The Court also explained that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." Id. at 
521-22 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). To allow Hartford to limit the protection 
afforded an insured or her beneficiaries, is not only inconsistent with the insurance 
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policy Ms. Berkemeir purchased from Hartford, but contrary to the longstanding 
policy of the Utah Supreme Court, to interpret such contracts of adhesion liberally 
in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries. 
Because Mr. Alexander's policy with Allstate did not fully compensate 
Ms. Berkemeir's out-of-pocket expenses, Mr. Alexander was an underinsured 
motorist, and Hartford is obligated to pay the Estate underinsured motorist benefits. 
Such payment would not result in a windfall for the Estate or an impermissible 
duplicate payment, where the parties have stipulated: "Due to the amount of 
Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the settlement with Allstate would not 
have fully compensated her for her loss," and the insurance policy defines an 
"underinsured motor vehicle" as a "vehicle . . . to which a bodily injury liability bond 
or policy applies at the time of the accident but the amount paid for bodily injury 
under that bond or policy is not enough to pay the full amount the insured is legally 
entitled to recover." Policy, Part C Section III, Insuring Agreement, para. C, p. 15 
(emphasis added). 
POINT IV 
HARTFORD'S POSITION IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LOGIC. 
In its opening brief,6 Hartford asserts the Estate is not "legally entitled to 
recover" on the insurance policy because the Estate cannot assert a "viable claim 
6
 Brief of Appellant Hartford at p. 23. 
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that is able to be reduced to a judgment in a court of law," citing Peterson v. Utah 
Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah App. 1996).7 According to 
Hartford, the Estate is not entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits because 
it cannot demonstrate there is an underlying personal injury which renders it legally 
entitled to recover. Therefore, Hartford asserts, the Estate does not have a viable 
claim. 
A. Hartford's Position Is Contrary to the Public Policy Which 
Encourages Settlement. 
The fact that Alexander's liability for personal injury was so clear, as not to 
require Ms. Berkemeir to obtain a judgment against Alexander, should not penalize 
the Estate, preventing it from securing underinsured motorist benefits where Ms. 
Berkemeir was not fully compensated for the damages she sustained as a result of 
the collision. Undoubtedly, Ms. Berkemeir had a viable claim against Mr. Alexander 
7
 In Peterson, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the "legally entitled to 
recover" language of the insurance policy at issue to mean "a viable claim that can 
be reduced to judgment in a court of law." The Court of Appeals utilized this 
definition in conjunction with the Utah Workers' Compensation Act to hold that the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for an employee 
injured in an automobile accident. Subsequently, in Lieberv. ITT Hartford Insurance 
Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (2000), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Peterson 
definition of the "legally entitled to recover" language and utilized it to interpret the 
uninsured motorist provision of Title 31 of the insurance code. The Court analyzed 
the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305(3) & (4) in conjunction with Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1), the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, to overrule that portion of the Utah Court of Appeals' holding in 
Peterson which prevented injured employees from making claims against parties 
other than the employer or its agents. 
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in light of the fact that the claim was reduced to a settlement for the limit of 
Alexander's policy with Allstate, and the parties in this case stipulated to his liability. 
In addition, Hartford obviously believed Ms. Berkemeir had a viable claim for 
which she was legally entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits because 
before Ms. Berkemeir died, Hartford agreed to enter into arbitration to resolve the 
matter. Hartford agreed to arbitrate despite the settlement agreement in place 
between Ms. Berkemeir and Alexander. The settlement agreement, by its terms, 
would prevent Ms. Berkemeir from bringing a personal injury claim against Mr. 
Alexander which was capable of being reduced to a judgment. The settlement 
agreement, by its terms, contained a release, which would mean that, after it was 
entered, Ms. Berkemeir was not "legally entitled" to recover from Mr. Alexander. As 
a result, it appears Hartford recognized the possibility for Ms. Berkemeir to be 
entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under the insurance policy despite the fact 
that she not longer was "legally entitled" to recover from Mr. Alexander and her claim 
was incapable of being reduced to judgment. 
Also, in U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 
1993), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an award of underinsured motorist benefits 
to Sandt, an insured who alreadv had received the limit of the insurance policv 
covering the tortfeasor's vehicle. Sandt's damages also exceeded the limit of the 
tortfeasor's policy. The opinion, however, does not indicate Sandt was only legally 
entitled to recover on the insurance policy because he asserted a "viable claim that 
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[wa]s able to be reduced to a judgment in a court of law," or a viable claim that had 
been reduced to judgment. Nonetheless, the Court held Sandt entitled to recover 
underinsured motorist benefits because the amount of his damages exceeded the 
limit of the tortfeasor's policy. Similarly, the Estate is entitled to receive underinsured 
motorist benefits because Ms. Berkemeir was not fully compensated by Alexander's 
policy for the damages she incurred as a result of the collision. 
In Slusher v. Ospital by Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "The public policy is to encourage settlements." Id. at 441 
(Utah 1989)(citing General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039, 1046 (Md. 
1980); accord, Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1244, 
1248 (Utah 1984); RioAlgom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980)). 
In light of the public policy encouraging settlement of claims, it is unlikely that the 
state legislature, by including the "arising out of personal injury" language in the 
Personal Injury Survival Statute, intended to require an insured to assert a "viable 
claim that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law", before being "legally 
entitled to recover" on a contract claim for underinsured motorist benefits against its 
insurer. Implementing such a requirement is not only contrary to the public policy 
encouraging settlement, but contrary to the fundamental paradigm governing the 
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practice of personal injury and insurance law. The net effect of such a requirement 
is to discourage settlement of underlying personal injury claims. 
B. Hartford's Position Is Inconsistent with the Plain Language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 and its Legislative History. 
Furthermore, Hartford's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 reads 
into the statute meaning beyond its plain words. "The best evidence of the true 
intent and purpose of the legislature is the plain language of the statute." Lieber v. 
ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 15 P.3d at 1034. Accordingly, if the legislature 
had intended Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to apply to limit causes of action based 
8
 As an insurance company, Hartford is very familiar with the manner in which 
personal injury and insurance defense litigation proceed. Nonetheless, Hartford 
utilizes the "arising from" language of the Personal Injury Survival Statute to breathe 
life into the "legally entitled to recover" language contained in the Policy, Part C, 
Section III, Insuring Agreement, paragraph A, at p. 14 it issued to Ms. Berkemeir. 
On the face of the Policy, it is impossible to discern that Hartford requires a 
judgment against the tortfeasor in order to recover underinsured motorist benefits 
under the Policy. If Hartford intended to require an insured to secure a judgment 
against the tortfeasor as a condition precedent to paying underinsured motorist 
benefits, it should have drafted such a provision into its Policy. 
The fact of the matter is that Hartford did not draft such a provision into its 
Policy and now seeks to apply the Personal Injury Survival Statute to Ms. Berkemeir 
in such a way as to create a condition precedent which prevents the Estate from 
recovering for the damages for which Ms. Berkemeir and the Estate have not been 
compensated. 
In all likelihood, this provision is not in the Policy because it is contrary to the 
practice of Hartford. Although facts concerning the business practices of Hartford 
are not in the record and properly before this Court, it is difficult to believe that 
Hartford requires aJi of its policyholders to secure judgments before receiving 
underinsured motorist benefits under its policies. 
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upon insurance contracts as Hartford suggests, the legislature would have done so 
explicitly. Ironically, there is no legislative history supporting such an interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12. 9 Rather, it appears that the legislature has 
consistently, and most recently in 2001, chosen not to include language regarding 
first-party insurance contracts when revising Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. In 
addition, the state legislature has not included provisions like those contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 in Title 31 A, the Utah Insurance Code which governs 
underinsured motorist coverage. 
Finally, if Hartford had intended to limit underinsured motorist coverage, it 
should have drafted such a provision into the insurance contract.10 To allow Hartford 
to limit the protection afforded an insured or her beneficiaries, is not only inconsistent 
with the insurance policy Ms. Berkemeir purchased from Hartford, but contrary to the 
longstanding policy of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals to 
9
 At pages 10-12 of its opening brief, Hartford provides a legislative history of 
Utah's Personal Injury Survival Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. This legislative 
history is noteworthy because of what it fails to say. Curiously absent from this 
legislative history is any indication that the state legislature intended the Personal 
Injury Survival Statute to apply to first-party insurance contracts. 
10
 As previously stated twice, and we apologize for the redundancy, in Sandt, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: "Insurance policies should be strictly construed 
against the insurer and in favor of the insured because they are adhesion contracts 
drafted by insurance companies." 854 P.2d 519,522 (Utah 1993). The Court also 
explained that "insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the 
insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 
insurance. Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
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interpret such contracts of adhesion liberally in favor of the insured and their 
beneficiaries. 
C. The Legal Analysis Set Forth in Hartford's Brief is Illogical. 
Hartford sponsors two illogical positions, the adoption of both of which are 
necessary to reach the conclusion that the Estate has no claim against Hartford: 
1. The Estate's damages are measured at the time the arbitration award 
is entered, not at the time the cause of action against Hartford accrues, 
causing Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) to apply to the interpretation 
of the "legally entitled" phrase in the underinsured motorist provision of 
the insurance policy; and 
2. Even though Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) applies, the under-
insured motorist provision of the insurance policy entitles Hartford to 
dictate that any recovery obtained by an insured must first be applied 
to out-of-pocket expenses and subsequently to all other damages 
incurred. 
Accepting either of these flawed positions would require this Court to ignore 
accepted standards for interpretation of insurance contracts and disregard when the 
cause of action accrued, which dictates when a vital element of the cause of action 
came into existence. 
If driven to its logical conclusion, accepting the first premise would mean that 
no insured who settled with the underlying tortfeasor would be able to maintain a 
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claim under an underinsured motorist coverage. Every settlement with the 
underlying tortfeasor results in a full release of the tortfeasor, in this case Mr. 
Alexander. Stipulation fl 13 (R. 21) Once that release is signed, the insured is no 
longer "legally entitled" to recover from the underinsured tortfeasor. Only by 
measuring whether the insured is legally entitled to recover at the time the cause of 
action accrues against Hartford accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run 
does the interpretation of "legally entitled to recover" make any sense. Further, the 
fact that Hartford chose to participate in the arbitration proceeding indicates that, 
prior to her death, Hartford believed the cause of action against Hartford had 
accrued. 
In support of these propositions, Hartford relies upon three cases: 
1. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); 
2. Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (Utah 2000); and 
3. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996). 
As discussed previously, Peterson is helpful for its interpretation of the "legally 
entitled to recover" language, the definition of which, was subsequently adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Lieber, 15 P.3d at 1034. Although relied upon heavily 
by Hartford, Lieber does not support its position. Rather, Lieber provides an 
analytical framework indicating that Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, Utah's Survival 
Statute, does not apply to the facts of this case. 
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Lieber involved an employee who was involved in an accident with uninsured 
motorists. Id. at 1032. The employee attempted to recover uninsured motorist 
benefits based upon an insurance policy Hartford issued to his employer. Id. 
Hartford denied the claim, asserting the Workers' Compensation Act provided the 
employee's exclusive remedy. Id. at 1033. 
The Utah Supreme Court examined the application Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-305(3) & (4)(1999),11 which states in relevant part: 
(3)(a) Uninsured motorist coverage... provides coverage 
for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicles because of bodily injury . . . . 
(4)(b)(ii) This [uninsured motorist] coverage does not apply 
to an employee, who is injured by an uninsured motorist, 
whose exclusive remedy is provided by . . . the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
The Court interpreted these statutory provisions in conjunction with Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which contains the following 
exclusive remedy provision: "The right to recover compensation pursuant to this 
chapter for injuries sustained by an employee, . . . shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent. 
or employee of the employer . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Based upon the plain 
language of these statutes, the Court found that the Workers' Compensation Act 
provides the exclusive remedy for injured employees to recover against their 
11
 This statutory language changed in 2000. 
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employers. Id. at 1035. Accordingly, the Court held that an injured employee does 
not have a viable claim against their employer or its agents, but has a viable claim 
against third parties. Id. The clear statutory preclusion contained in the Workers' 
Compensation Act prevents an injured employee from having a viable claim against 
their employer and agents of their employer. 
Similarly in Clyde, the Utah Supreme Court held that grandparents are not 
legally entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits for the wrongful death of 
their grandchildren because under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11 -6, 
because without more, they are not the parents or guardians of their grandchildren. 
920 P.2d at 1186. In Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6, there is a clear statutory 
requirement that those bringing the claim for wrongful death of a minor child be the 
parent or guardian of the injured or deceased child. By the language of the statute, 
all others are precluded from having a viable claim which can be reduced to 
judgment. 
While Hartford no longer disputes that a first party contractual relationship 
exists between the Estate and Hartford, in its analysis, Hartford fails to acknowledge 
that the Utah Supreme Court in Lieber and Clyde arrived at its holdings based upon 
the plain language of the statutes at issue. Utah's Personal Injury Survival Statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12, by its very terms, does not apply to the Estate's 
contract claim against Hartford for underinsured motorist benefits. 
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Moreover, in Lieber and Clyde, the Court did not engage in a conclusory 
analysis of the "viable claim" language implicated by the "legally entitled to recover" 
provision of the statute. Rather, the Court engaged in a careful analysis of the facts 
under the relevant statutory provisions and applicable case law. Here, Hartford 
asserts that "this court should reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue, and find 
that the survival statute applies to limit any requisite 'viable claim' that the Estate 
could bring against the underinsured tortfeasor, and in turn, limits the Estate's claim 
for UIM benefits." Brief of Appellant Hartford at p. 20. Hartford cannot support this 
assertion, however, because the analytical framework of Lieber and Clyde in 
conjunction with the plain language of the Personal Injury Survival Statute, do not 
support this contention. 
As a result, Hartford attempts to distort the requirements of the "legally entitled 
to recover" language, asserting: "If Berkemeir's claim was settled while she was 
alive, then the Estate cannot make the requisite showing of a continuing "viable 
claim" against the underinsured tortfeasor that would permit them [sic] to seek UIM 
benefits." Brief of Appellant Hartford at p. 23. There is no requirement in the case 
law requiring the claim to be "continuing." The case law merely requires that Ms. 
Berkemeir, upon accrual of her claim, have a claim capable of being reduced to 
judgment. Hartford's modification of the statutory requirement is merely a means of 
avoiding the fact that Ms. Berkemeir had a viable claim against Mr. Alexander which 
she reduced to settlement, qualifying her to invoke the underinsured motorist 
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provision in the insurance contract Hartford issued to her. Alternatively, Hartford 
asserts that "Berkemeir died prior to final 'judgment or settlement' of her personal 
injury claim." Brief of Appellant Hartford at p. 23 (emphasis added). This assertion, 
however, is contrary to Hartford's acknowledgment that the Estate's claim against 
Hartford is based upon a first party contractual relationship. Brief of Appellant 
Hartford at p. 14. In addition, it is contrary to the stipulated facts of this case. 
Paragraph 13 of the Stipulation states: "On October 9, 1996, Ms. Berkemeir 
executed a settlement agreement and release with Mr. Alexander in exchange for 
the full $50,000 policy limits of his liability insurance policy with Allstate Insurance 
Company ("Allstate"). (R. 22)(emphasis added). 
Hartford also asserts "If Berkemeir's receipt of Alexander's policy limits fully 
concluded, or settled, her personal injury claim while she was alive, then Hartford's 
contractual obligation to provide UIM benefits was never implicated at all, because 
Mr. Alexander would not have been underinsured." Brief of Appellant Hartford at p. 
23 (emphasis added). This assertion is also contrary to the Stipulated Facts in this 
case. Paragraph 14 of the Stipulation provides: "Due to the amount of Ms. 
Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the settlement with Allstate would not 
have fully compensated her for her loss." (R. 21 )(emphasis added). 
Continuing with the tradition Hartford's sister corporation established in Lieber 
v. ITT Hartford Ins. Center, Inc., 15 P.3d 1030, 1038-39 (Utah 2000), Hartford 
tortures the analysis and holdings of these cases. The "inaccurate assertions in 
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Hartford's brief referred to in Lieber, appear in this case in the form of an incomplete 
and inaccurate statement of facts, and an attempt to torture the analysis and holding 
of key cases in an effort to avoid paying underinsured motorist benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to interpret the underinsured 
motorist provision contained in most automobile insurance policies in the situation 
where the insured dies prior to the time an arbitration award under the policy is 
entered. Applying standards for the interpretation of insurance policies, and focusing 
upon when a cause of action for breach of contract accrues, it becomes clear that 
Ms. Berkemeir's damages are measured as of the date of Hartford's breach of the 
insurance policy, when Hartford refused to pay all or any portion of the insurance 
coverage to Ms. Berkemeir, despite her demand. As a result, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-12 does not apply to the facts of this case, and the Estate was entitled to 
Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
This Court should affirm the District Court's Order Granting the Estate's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-196) 
Dated: February 1, 2002. 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
Mark-A. Larsen 
Lisa C. Rico 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-21-313. 
31A-21-313. Limitation of actions. 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party 
insurance must be commenced within three years after the 
inception of the loss. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this 
title the law applicable to limitation of actions in Title 78, 
Chapter 12, Limitation of Actions, applies to actions on 
insurance policies. 
(3) An insurance policy may not: 
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy 
to a time less than that authorized by statute; 
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on 
the policy; or 
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to 
permissible arbitration provisions in contracts. 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice 
to the complainant will arise from a delay in bringing suit 
against an insurer, which prejudice is other than the delay 
itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an 
insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the 
earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as 
required under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in 
which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration proce-
dure prescribed by the insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to 
by the parties. 199Q 
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Minute Entry dated May 7, 2001. (R. 203 - R. 204) 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 








Case No: 990911059 PI 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: May 7, 2001 
Clerk: evelynt 
HEARING 
The Court has considered the parties positions on the scope of the 
order granting summary judgment to plaintiff, and is satisfied that 
plaintiff's original proposed order properly sets forth the basis 
for granting summary judgment. 
Defendant's objections are overruled. 
The plaintiff's proposed order is enteredyas of the date of this 
minute entry. 
The minute entry stands as the Court's qfider on objections to form 
of summary judgment. 
Dated this J day of MOyJ 
I^MOTHY R. HANSON 
'District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY 
BERKEMEIR, by and through its 
Executor, KAREN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF THE MIDWEST, 
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS 
AND LEGAL POSITIONS OF 
PARTIES 
Civil No. 990911059 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant. 
The Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir, by and through its Executor Karen Nielsen, 
("Berkemeir Estate") and Hartford Insurance Company of the I lidwest ("Hartford") stipulate 
to the following: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The decedent Dorothy Berkemeir ("Ms. Berkemeir") was n resident of Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Ms. Berkemeir died on August 15, 1997. 
2. Plaintiff Karen Nielsen, a resident of Summit County, Utah, is the properly 
appointed executor of the Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir (the "Berkemeir Estate"). 
3. Defendant Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Hartford") is a 
foreign corporation coodiictiiig business as an insurance company and validly licensed to do 
business in Utah with the Utah Department of Insurance. 
4. The matter in controversy is in excess of $20,000.00, and the claims arose in 
Salt Lake County, although Hartford,, disputes that the Berkenieir Estate is entitled to recover 
any sums at all, including but not limited to sums in excess of $20,000.00. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4, and venue is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4 and § 78-13-7. 
FACTS 
6. On October 16, 1995, Ms. Berkemeir was a passenger in her vehicle, traveling 
in an easterly direction in the left lane of Interstate 80, approximately nine miles west of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. 
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7. Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was being driven by her daughter, Mary Davis. 
8. Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was covered by a personal automobile insurance policy 
issued by Hartford, effective January 24, 1995 to January 24, 1996, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint filed herein. 
*. James Alexander, a Washington resident, was operating his vehicle in an 
easterly direction in the right lane of Interstate 80, when he suddenly turned directly in front of 
Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle. 
10. The driver of Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was unable to avoid striking Mr. 
Alexander's vehicle. 
11. As a direct and proximate result ur. Alexander's negligence, Ms. Berkemeir 
sustained personal injuries, incurred medical expenses, and was subjected to and endured pain 
and suffering. 
12. The medical expenses incurred by Ms, Berkemeir as a proximate result of the 
accident total $ 38,249.29.1 
1
 This is the amount claimed by the Berkemeir Estate in its Complaint. Hartford will assume that 
amount to be correct solely for purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment that will be filed in this 
action. The parties cannot presently stipulate to the specific amount of medical expenses incurred by 
Ms. Berkemeir and her Estate that were covered and/or paid by insurance. If the Court determines 
that this figure is necessary to resolve the parties' motions for summary judgment, the determination of 
this issue is reserved for a later time. 
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13. On October 9, 1996, Ms. Berkemeir executed a settlement agreement and 
release with Mr. Alexander in exchange for the full $50,000 policy limits of his liability 
insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). 
14. Due to the amount of Ms. Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the 
settlement with Allstate would not have fully compensated her for her loss. 
15. Ms. Berkemeir's aiito policy from Hartford (the "Policy") extended coverage 
for medical payments and personal injury protection (Policy, Part B). Hartford paid the 
medical payment limit of $5,000 under this coverage provision of the Policy, Hartford also 
paid the personal injury protection limit of $5,000 under this coverage provision. Payments 
made by Hartford under Part B of the Policy totaled $10,000. All Part B payments were 
directed to reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by N Irs Berkemeir as a result of the 
automobile accident of October 16, 1995. 
16. The Policy also extended underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to Ms. 
Berkemeir, with limits of $100,000 per person < Pol in Pun C, Section III). The following 
provisions applicable to UIM coverage are included in the Policy: 
• We will pay compensatory damages which an insured is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
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The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
(Policy, Part C, in Insuring Agreement, paragraph A, at p. 14) 
• "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle . . 
. of any type to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the amount paid for 
bodily injury under that bond or policy to an insured is not 
enough to pay the full amount the insured is legally entitled to 
recover as damages. 
(Policy, Part C, Section III, paragraph C, at p. 15) 
• We will not make a duplicate payment under this coverage for 
any element of loss for which payment has been made by or 
on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible. 
(Policy, Section III, I imit of I liability, paragraph C. at p. 16) 
17. Ms. Berkemeir made demand upon Hartford for payment of the $100,000 limits 
under her UIM coverage, resulting in an arbitration proceeding originally scheduled to begin 
on July 21, 1997. The hearing was subsequently rescheduled for September 23, 1997 because 
of an independent medical examination of Ms. Berkemeir that had to be rescheduled. 
18, Ms. Berkemeir died on August 15, 1997 of causes unrelated to the automobile 
accident of October 16, 1995. 
19 After Ms. Berkemeir's death and prior to the rescheduled arbitration 
proceeding, the Berkemeir Estate demanded payment from Hail lord of* $45,580.40 under the 
UIM coverage as a contractual claim against the Policy. 
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20. Hartford denied the Berkemeir Estate's contractual claim against the Policy in 
light of its interpretation of applicable Utah law, and Ms. Berkemeii "s death In pai t, 
Hartford's denial nt the claim was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1), which states: 
(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of 
another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the 
injured person. The injured person or the personal representative 
or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the 
wrong doer for special and general damages, subject to 
Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person 
dies as a result of a cause other than the injury received as a 
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the 
personal representatives or heirs of that person are entitled to 
receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or 
on behalf of that injured person as the result of his injury. 
21. After Ms. Berkemeir's demise Hartford withdrew its demand to arbitrate, 
believing that there was no benefit owing to the Berkemeir Estate because of Ms. Berkemeir's 
death from causes unrelated to the accident 1 lie Berkemeir Estate then filed this action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION 
22. The disputes in this case focus on: 
a) whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is controlling; 
b) whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) bars the Berkemeir Estate's UIM 
claim against the Policy; 
c) whether the Berkemeir Estate's claim is contractual in nature; 
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d) whether the claim arises out of personal injury within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-11-12(1); 
e) whether the medical expenses incurred by Ms. Berkemeir are "out-of-pocket 
expenses" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1); 
f) whether the Alexander vehicle is "underinsured* within the meaning of the 
Policy; and 
g) whether the Berkemeir Estate is legally entitled to recover any UIM benefits 
from 1 lartford given the Policy language, applicable Utah law, Ms Berkemeir's 
demise, her prior settlement with Allstate, and the payments Hartford made under Part 
B of the Policy. 
LEGAL POSITION OF BERKEMEIR ESTATE 
23. If Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is not controlling, pursuant to the terms of the 
Policy, the Berkemeir Estate claims that Hartford is indebted to the Berkemeir Estate in the 
amount of $100,000 and has damaged the Berkemeir Estate in that amount by failing to pay 
that sum, in addition to interest. 
24. Upon her death, it Utah < ode Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is applicable, the Berkemeir 
Estate alternatively claims payment under the UIM coverage as a contractual claim against the 
Policy, "out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that injured person as a result of 
his injury" of the medical expenses necessarily incurred as a result of the October 16, 1995, 
collision, in addition to interest. In this regard, the Berkemeir Estate claims that the "out-of-
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pocket" expenses it is entitled to recover consist of medical expenses totaling $38,249.29 paid 
by Ms. Berkemeir or paid by others on her behalf. 
25. If Utah Cc)de Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is applicable, the Berkemeir Estate is entitled 
to interest on the medical expenses at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the 
accident, October 16, 1995 IJtah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. 
LEGAL POSITION OF HARTFORD 
26. Under the Hartford Policy, the Estate is entitled to recover from Hartford what 
Dorothy Berkemeir would have been "legally entitled" to recover from Alexander if he had 
unlimited liability coverage (see 116). 
27. Ms. Berkemeir died of causes unrelated to the accident (see 118). 
28. Utah. Code Ann, §7K 1 I-12( I) deierrnines what an estate is legally entitled to • 
recover from a tortfeasor if the plaintiff died from causes that were not related to the accident. 
By its terms, this statute applies to "causes of action arising out of personal injury." (See 
120). Therefore, the statiite applies to this case, since the Estate's claim for UIM benefits is a 
cause of action that arises out of personal injuries sustained by Ms. Berkemeir (see 1111, 17). 
By its terms, the statute limits the Estate's claims against Hartford to "out-of-pocket 
expenses." (See 120). 
29. Hartford is entitled to summary judgment in this action on two separate but 
related grounds: 
8 
• First: The maximum amount of out-of-pocket expenses claimed by the 
Estate is $38,249.29 (see 512). This amount is less than the $50,000 limits of Alexander's 
Allstate policy (see 113). Hartford's Policy obligates it to pay UIM benefits only when the 
accident was caused by an "underinsured motor vehicle," which is contractually defined as a 
vehicle that is covered by a bodily injury liability policy with a limit that is "not enough to pay 
the full amount the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages." (See f 16). Because the 
limits of Alexander's policy exceed the maximum recoverable special damages incurred by Ms. 
Berkemeir and her Estate, Alexander was not operating an "underinsured motor vehicle" when 
the accident occurred. Therefore, the Estate is not entitled to UIM benefits under the Hartford 
Policy. 
• Second: The UIM portion of the Hartford Policy states that Hartford 
will not make a "duplicate payment... for any element of loss for which payment has been 
made by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible." (See ^16). 
Ms. Berkemeir has already received $60,000 for her loss ($50,000 from Allstate on 
Alexander's behalf, and $10,000 from Hartford) (see 1113 and 15). These payments constitute 
an "element of loss for which payment has been made . . . " Accordingly, the UIM portion of 
the Hartford Policy is not implicated in this matter until the Estate's recoverable damages 
exceed $60,000. It is undisputed that the maximum amount of out-of-pocket expenses claimed 
by the Estate is less than $60,000 (see 112). Therefore, Hartford owes no UIM benefits to the 
Estate as a matter of law. 
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30. In the event the Court finds that the Estate is entitled to recover some 
amount of out-of-pocket expenses, such expenses are not the total amount of medical expenses 
incurred by Ms. Berkemeir and her Estate because of the accident. Rather, "out-of-pocket 
expenses" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) are limited to medical 
expenses that were actually paid by Ms. Berkemeir or her Estate, and for which no 
reimbursement was received. 
31. In the event the Court awards some out-of-pocket expenses to the Plaintiff, the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44, pertaining to interest thereon, are applicable. 
Dated: August ^ , 2 0 0 0 . 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
Jiateen Sj Mantas 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
^lark't. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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